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ABSTRACT 
The optimal choice of the exchange rate regime has been a fundamental 
macroeconomic policy issue, especially for small open economies. Based on the 
doctrine of the impossible trinity, the decision of a fixed or a flexible exchange rate may 
determine the monetary policy independence. Nevertheless, the issue of the monetary 
policy independence under the flexible exchange rate regime has been at the heart of the 
debate. This thesis empirically studies the issue of monetary independence in the context 
of four Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) in East Asia~Hong Kong, South Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan. With a measure of monetary policy proxied by a domestic short-
term interest rate and the independence reflected by the linkage between the domestic 
rate and the U.S. rate, this thesis examines the existence of a long run comovement 
between the domestic rates of the four NIEs and that of the U.S. using monthly data. 
The observation period begins in a month following the adoption of the current 
exchange rate arrangement, which is November 1983 for Hong Kong, March 1980 for 
South Korea, August 1973 for Singapore, and May 1989 for Taiwan, and ends in 
December 2006. 
Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration test procedures are applied to investigate 
the long run comovement. The evidence of cointergration is found in the cases of Hong 
Kong and Singapore but not in those of South Korea and Taiwan. The corresponding 
error correction models are also estimated for the cases of Hong Kong and Singapore. 
The findings in these two cases are very similar. They suggest that the domestic interest 
rate movement is indifferent to adopting a currency board system or a managed float in 
small open economies. 
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The issue of monetary independence under flexible exchange rate regimes has been 
a subject of debate. Borensztein, Zettelmeyer, and Philippon (2001) and Frankel, 
Schmukler, and Serven (2004) present evidence supporting a conventional proposition 
that flexible exchange rate regimes offer a certain extent of monetary independence. 
However, Frankel (1999) questions the ability of emerging flexible-rate economies such 
as Mexico and Brazil to preserve monetary independence. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) 
offer an alternative view that countries under flexible exchange rate regimes act similar 
to those under the fixed ones. The conventional and alternative views are elaborated in 
more detail below. 
Regarding the conventional view, based on the doctrine of the impossible trinity 
which describes the tradeoff among exchange stability, monetary independence, and 
capital mobility, flexible exchange rate regimes have the advantage of monetary policy 
autonomy. Hence, with perfect capital flows, monetary authorities who are willing to 
preserve monetary independence should choose a flexible exchange rate regime. 
Empirically, Borensztein et al. (2001) find that an economy with a flexible exchange 
rate, such as Singapore, has a greater ability to preserve monetary independence than an 
economy with a fixed exchange rate, such as Hong Kong. This ability is measured in 
terms of the power of insulating domestic monetary conditions from international 
financial shocks. Frankel et al. (2004) show that flexible exchange rate regimes do have 
greater monetary independence, in the sense of a smaller reaction of domestic to 
international interest rates. 
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However, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) suggest an alternative view on the issue of 
monetary independence of flexible exchange rate regimes, and they argue that the 'fear 
of floating' has led many declared floating countries, such as Bolivia, Canada, India, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Republic of Chile, Korea, and Singapore, to manage their exchange 
rate fluctuations within a 土 2.5o/o band. The 'fear of floating' view argues that these 
countries are acting much the same way as those who adopted the fixed exchange rate 
system by tracking their domestic interest rates close to the rates of major currency 
countries in order to stabilize their exchange rates against major currencies. Frankel 
(1999) finds that countries with floating or intermediate exchange rate regimes are 
influenced more by the United States' (the U.S.) monetary policy and concludes that the 
presence of exchange rate uncertainties diminishes the ability to preserve monetary 
independence, in terms of insulating domestic monetary conditions from international 
financial shocks. 
The issue of monetary independence is more controversial among East Asian 
economies. After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) argued that East Asian economies should float more freely against the U.S. dollar 
in order to avoid further turmoil. However, McKinnon and Schnabl (2004) show that the 
day-to-day volatility of the exchange rates of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand against the U.S. dollar were 
negligible by 2002. Moreover, Dooley, Folkets-Landau, and Garber (2003) criticize East 
Asian monetary authorities have intervened heavily in order to prevent their currencies 
from appreciating. The current literature argues that the East Asian economies are only 
claiming but not acting as under floating regimes. A question naturally arises: Do these 
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countries still enjoy the advantages of adopting flexible exchange rate regimes? This 
thesis attempts to investigate whether or not the choice of exchange rate regimes 
influences the autonomy of the monetary policy. 
This thesis aims to empirically study the issue of monetary policy independence in 
the context of four Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) in East Asia~Hong Kong, 
South Korea (Korea, hereafter), Singapore, and Taiwan. The choice of these four 
economies is based on the fact that they have greater openness to trade. Liu (1992) and 
Kim and Lau (1994) cite these four economies as successful examples of economic 
growth based on their export-oriented policies. Table 1 lists their average shares of 
exports and imports in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the period of 1980 to 2005 
with a comparison of high-income developed countries. The average shares of Table 1 
indicate that the four NIEs have trade shares in GDP higher than the high-income 
developed countries (the U.S., the European Union, and Japan). While a stable exchange 
rate is necessary in prospering trade, the choice of an exchange rate regime is a crucial 
decision for these four trade-lead-growth economies. Hong Kong has pegged its 
currency to the U.S. dollar for a year in 1973, and then shifted to a free floating system 
from 1975 to 1983. Since October 1983, it has adopted a currency board arrangement. 
Singapore fixed its currency to the pound sterling before the collapse of the Sterling 
Area in June 1972 and has experienced a managed float since then. After World War II， 
both Korea and Taiwan chose to peg to the U.S. dollar in 1964 and 1949 respectively. 
After the end of this peg, they both adopted a managed float and then a free float. 
Details of the exchange rate regime development of these four NIEs are presented in 
Chapter 3. According to the de facto classification of the IMF dated June 2006, Hong 
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Kong is under a currency board system, Korea has an independent floating system and 
Singapore has adopted a managed floating system. According to Yu (1999)，Taiwan has 
claimed that it is an independent floater since 1989�Because different exchange rate 
regimes are adopted by these four economically similar NIEs, this thesis chooses them 
to empirically study the issue of monetary policy independence. 
McKinnon and Schnabl (2004) documented that, after the Asian financial crisis, 
many East Asian economies 'let their currencies fall precipitately when they were 
attacked'. However, the extent of floating in these East Asian countries is questionable. 
Most East Asian countries kept pegging to the U.S. dollar even if they were de jure 
floaters after the financial crisis. Accordingly, these countries, even if formally floating， 
are de facto 'importing' the monetary policy of the U.S., as much as those pegged. 
Dooley et al. (2003) criticize that East Asian monetary authorities have intervened 
heavily in order to prevent their currencies from appreciating. This makes the monetary 
policy independence under de jure floating systems questionable. 
With a focus on the four NIEs, the purpose of this thesis is to explore whether 
flexible exchange rate regimes allow an independent monetary policy or, more 
specifically, whether or not interest rates in the economies with a managed float, such as 
Singapore, or an independent float, such as Korea and Taiwan, are less sensitive to the 
U.S. rate in comparison with a linked-rate economy, such as Hong Kong. One should 
take note that the currency board system adopted in Hong Kong is different from the 
conventional fixed exchange rate regime or non-currency-board fixed exchange rate 
regime. This system is legitimately named as the 'dollar exchange standard' and is 
1 Since Taiwan lost its seat in IMF in 1971，the de facto exchange rate regime classification does not 
include Taiwan. 
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formally named as the 'linked exchange rate system'. In this thesis, the term 'fixed 
exchange rate system' is loosely applied to the Hong Kong system. Details of the 
official fixed rate are given in the review of exchange rate regime development of Hong 
Kong in Chapter 3. 
The main findings of this study are briefly summarized as follows. The 
conventional view that flexible exchange rate regimes allow the economies to pursue 
independent monetary policy is empirically supported. A long run relationship is found 
to exist between the Hong Kong rate and the U.S. rate. With the implementation of the 
linked rate in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong interest rate has to be adjusted along with the 
U.S. rate. In the cases of two independent floaters, Korea and Taiwan, no long run 
relationship between the domestic rates and the U.S. rate is found. The changes in the 
Korea rate with respect to those in the U.S. rate are statistically insignificant. The 
empirical findings of the cases of Korea and Taiwan suggest that flexible regimes appear 
to provide a greater extent of monetary independence than the currency board system. In 
contrast, the results of Singapore support the view of 'fear of floating'. They are very 
similar to the case of Hong Kong implying that the Singapore rate has to be kept closely 
in line with the U.S. rate in the long run. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of 
the literature on the issue of monetary independence across different exchange rate 
regimes. Chapter 3 examines how the U.S. dollar affects the four NIEs' exchange rate 
regimes and their exchange rate policies. The methodology employed is explained in 





The existence of monetary independence in countries with either fixed or flexible 
exchange rates has attracted great research interest. Many studies, such as those by 
Borensztein et al. (2001), Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Bordo and MacDonald (2003), 
Frankel et al. (2004), and Shambaugh (2004) have been conducted to examine whether 
or not the choice of exchange rate regimes influences the monetary policy independence. 
On the one hand, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) have shown a phenomenon of 'fear of 
floating'; that is, many countries declaring flexible regimes' limit exchange rate 
flexibility and not being able to enjoy, or choosing not to enjoy, the monetary autonomy 
bestowed on the flexible rates. On the other hand, Bordo and Macdonald (2003) have 
provided evidence that the inter-war gold standard, a credible fixed rate system, confers 
monetary autonomy on the monetary authorities. 
Monetary independence has been measured differently in the literature. For 
example, Borensztein et al. (2001) regard this independence as the ability of the 
economic authority to retain the domestic nominal interest rate as a policy instrument. 
Frankel et al. (2004) regard it as a country's ability to implement its own interest rate 
policy when there are changes in the monetary stance of the U.S. Shambaugh (2004) 
considers the movements in a short-term nominal interest rate apart from that of a 'base 
currency country' as a measurement of independence, wherein the base currency 
country is one of the following: the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany, South Africa, 
Australia, and Belgium. 
Besides the different measurements of independence, contrasting results are found 
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with different estimation methods. Frankel et al. (2004) and Shambaugh (2004) support 
a conventional view which follows the doctrine of the impossible trinity. However, 
Bordo and MacDonald (2003) provide evidence of a view contrary to the conventional 
one. These three studies investigate the existence of independence by estimating the 
sensitivity of domestic interest rates to the changes in the rates of major currency 
countries. Frankel et al. (2004) use the unrestricted autoregressive-distributed lag 
approach to determine if there is a cointegration between the nominal interest rates of 
50 countries and that of the U.S. or Germany. It is found that both the impossible trinity 
and the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) empirically hold, as most pegged 
countries in their sample follow the U.S. or Germany more than non-pegged countries. 
Shambaugh (2004) uses simple OLS to estimate how rates of the major currency 
countries affect domestic rates of both flexible-rate and fixed-rate countries. The results 
support the conventional theoretical view, in which the interest rates of fixed-rate 
countries show a greater extent of comovement with the major currency countries' rates 
than those of the flexible-rate countries. Bordo and MacDonald (2003) employ a 
cointegration approach due to Johansen (1988, 1991) based on a VAR framework to 
estimate the co-movement among interest rates of the U.K., France, Germany and the 
U.S. Instead of investigating the existence of monetary independence under floating 
regimes, the authors examine the extent of monetary independence under the inter-war 
gold standard—a credible fixed exchange rate regime. In contrast to the conventional 
view which suggests a lack of monetary policy independence under fixed exchange rate 
regimes, the findings show that 'short-term interest rates in the inter-war period could 
have been used to engage in independent monetary policies'. 
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Inconclusive findings are presented in studies about the East Asian countries. 
Borensztein et al. (2001) show that interest rates in Hong Kong, which has a fixed 
exchange rate regime, react much more to the U.S. interest rates than the interest rates 
of Singapore, which adopts a floating-rate system. In contrast, Frankel et al. (2004) find 
that in the long run local interest rates are adjusted fully to international interest rates, 
regardless of the exchange rate regime for Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Besides the contrasting results, the methodology employed in the studies of 
Frankel et al. (2004) and Borensztein et al. (2001) arouse great discussion. The main 
regressions in Frankel et al. (2004) are run on levels of interest rate data. As with many 
macroeconomic data time series, it is believed that the interest rate series possesses a 
unit root.2 The regressions using level interest rates, without checking their nature of 
stationarity, may encounter spurious regressions. Moreover, a large sample of 45 
countries is employed in the study by Frankel et al. (2004)，but the diversity among 
these countries is not considered in the pooled regression. In spite of the fact that some 
countries may follow different major countries' rate, the pooled regressions take the U.S. 
rate as the international rate and compare the 45 countries' rate with the U.S. rate. In 
particular, Frankel et al. (2004) test the European countries with the U.S. rate in the 
pooled regressions, except for the sub-sample period of the 1990s. Furthermore, as 
pointed out by Borensztein et al. (2001), the explanatory variables in the regressions in 
study of Frankel et al. (2004) may be contemporaneously correlated with the error term 
due to common shocks affecting both the domestic and foreign interest rates, thereby 
leading to a potential endogeneity problem. 
As a remedy, Borensztein et al. (2001) consider changes in domestic rates to avoid 
2 See Wu and Zhang (1997) and citations therein. 
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a spurious regression. Instead of using changes in the international rates, they use 
estimated monetary shocks as the explanatory variables to avoid the endogeneity 
problem. However, in testing the response of a foreign shock, they do not answer the 
question of whether or not fixed exchange rate regimes enforce domestic interest rates 
following the rates of the anchored country as the theory says it should. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES OF THE FOUR NIES 
As a consequence of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the 
liquidation of the Sterling Area in 1972, many economies opted to offer flexibility to 
their currencies. Hong Kong went through a free floating period from 1974 to 1983. 
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have adopted a managed float since 1980, 1973，and 
1978 respectively. Later on, Hong Kong has pegged its currency to the U.S. dollar since 
1983. Korea and Singapore pegged their currencies, respectively, to the Special Drawing 
Right (SDR) in 1980 and an undisclosed basket in 1985, in which the U.S. dollar is 
believed to be a member. Taiwan surrendered the fixed system in exchange of a 
managed float in 1978. 
To review the position of the U.S. dollar in the exchange rate regimes of the four 
NIEs, the development of their exchange rate systems after the Bretton Woods era is 
investigated first. According to the International Monetary Fund (1999, p.964), the 
spectrum of nominal exchange rate regimes is divided into eight classes ranging from 
"exchange rate arrangement with no separate legal tender" at the fixed end to the 
"independent floating' at the flexible end. In the coming chapters of this thesis, the 
'flexible' exchange rate regime refers to the second to the last and the last classes at the 
flexible end of the spectrum, that is, the 'managed floating with no predetermined path 
for the exchange rate' and 'independently floating'. 
After a review on the exchange rate system development of the four NIEs, this 
chapter attempts to explore the importance of the U.S. dollar in their exchange rate 
policies using a regression similar to the one used by Frankel and Wei (1994). 
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3.1 Review of the Exchange Rate Regimes of the Four NIEs 
Hong Kong3 
Prior to the adoption of currency board system, the Hong Kong dollar was set free 
to float from 1975 through 1983. Hong Kong has been operating under a currency board 
system since October 1983. This system is legitimately named as the 'dollar exchange 
standard' and formally named as the 'linked exchange rate system'. To date, the Hong 
Kong dollar is linked to the U.S. dollar. Under this system, a fixed official rate of 
7.8HKD/USD is set between the Exchange Fund and the note-issuing banks. The 
issuing banks have to pay USD 1.00 to the Exchange Fund to obtain a Certificate of 
Indebtedness for issuing each HKD7.80. Similarly, the Exchange Fund is required to 
give USD 1.00 to the issuing banks for every Certificate of Indebtedness worth 
HKD7.80. However, in the exchange market, the exchange rate is determined by the 
market forces for the general public. The convergence of the official rate and the market 
rate is maintained by two adjustment mechanisms: the Cantillon-Hume mechanism and 
the 'arbitrage and competition' mechanism'^. 
Although the official rate is formally named as the 'linked' exchange rate, in this 
thesis, the 'fixed' or 'pegged' exchange rate is informally and loosely applied to the case 
of Hong Kong. 
South Korea^ 
The Korean won (the Won) was pegged to the U.S. dollar from May 1964 to 
February 1980 by a single currency peg system. In February 1980, the fixed rate of the 
Won to the U.S. dollar was abandoned and a managed floating rate, Effective Rate, was 
3 For extensive research in the development of the Hong Kong currency, see Jao (1993) 
4 See Jao (1993) Chapter 5 and Jao (1998) for the operation of these two mechanisms. 
5 See Sung (1987), Gerlach, Pisani-Ferry and Park (1999) and Chung, Joo and Yang (2000) for details. 
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established. In March 1980, the single currency peg system was substituted by a double 
basket peg system. Under this system, the exchange rate of the Won was linked to the 
SDR in combination with a basket of the currencies of South Korea's major trading 
partners, namely, the U.S., Japan, Germany, and Canada. Starting from 1989，the 
exchange rate of the Won was allowed to fluctuate around a base rate against the U.S. 
dollar. In March 1990，the Effective Rate was replaced by a Market Average Rate, which 
was determined by the market forces in an interbank market, the Seoul Foreign 
Exchange Market. The new rate was to float freely within a margin of 0.4%. From 1990 
to 1995, the margin increased from 0.4% to 2.25%. As a consequence of the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997，the Won depreciated rapidly. As an attempt to defend the local 
currency, the Korean government widened its Won trading margin from 2.25% to 10% 
in November 1997, and finally abolished the trading margin to set the Won free to float 
in December of the same year. 
Singapore^ 
Singapore was a colony of Great Britain before 1963. Hence, when the Singapore 
dollar was created in 1967，it was pegged to the Sterling. With the demolishment of the 
Sterling Area, the Singapore government pegged its currency to the U.S. dollar from 
1972 through 1973. Starting from June 1973，the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS) adopted a managed floating system and managed the Singapore dollar against an 
undisclosed trade weighted basket of currencies of Singapore's main trading partners 
and competitors. A base value of the Singapore dollar is determined on the basis of 
export competitiveness and the currency values of countries which are the main source 
of imported inflation. Moreover, there is an undisclosed fluctuation band around the 
6 See Gerlach and Gerlach-Kristen (2006) and Raj an and Siregar (2002) for details. 
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estimated base value. Both the value and the band are periodically reviewed. 
Taiwan^ 
The New Taiwan dollar (N.T. dollar) was pegged to the U.S. dollar from 1949 
through 1978. In July 1978, the Taiwan government abandoned the fixed rate system, 
and adopted a managed floating system in the following year, 1979. Under the managed 
floating system, the exchange rate of the N.T. dollar was determined not by the central 
bank but by the Center of Foreign Exchange, which was composed of five main 
Taiwanese banks, namely, the Bank of Taiwan, the Chinese International Commercial 
Bank, the First Commercial Bank, Hua-Nan Commercial Bank, and Chang-Hua 
Commercial Bank. A band of 土 m from the previous day's rate was allowed for 
adjustment of the exchange rate of the N.T. dollar. In April 1989, the managed float 
system was replaced by a floating system. Under the floating system, the 2.25% trading 
range was removed and, to date, the N.T. dollar is determined by the exchange market 
supply and demand. 
3.2 Frankel-Wei Regression 
According to the findings of the literature on optimum currency areas, many East 
Asian currencies are officially or de facto linked to a basket of major currencies so as to 
stabilize their foreign exchange value. However, the weights assigned to various 
currencies are typically not announced. Frankel and Wei (1994) regress nine Asian 
currencies on foreign currencies in an attempt to estimate the implicit weights assigned 
by each Asian country to different foreign currencies. 
Frankel and Wei (1994) conclude that all the nine East Asian countries have 
assigned a heavy weight to the U.S. dollar (the Dollar) upon obtaining a larger (relative 
7 See Yu (1999) for details. 
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to the coefficients of other foreign currencies) and statistically significant coefficient of 
the Dollar. The Dollar continues to affect all the nine Asian currencies by being a 
dominant international currency in East Asian exchange rate policies. By employing 
data for a period of post-Bretton Woods era, the Frankel-Wei regression is carried out in 
this thesis to examine the role of the Dollar in the four NIEs' exchange rate policies. 
Following the idea of Frankel and Wei (1994)，the weight of the U.S. dollar assigned 
to the four NIEs exchange rate policies is estimated by regressing the following equation: 
Ei w'usUSD, + WjpJPY^ + w'c^RMB^ + w'^^DEM, + s\ (1) 
where E is the currency of the four NIEs; i denotes the four NIEs: Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan; USD is the U.S. dollar; JPY is the Japanese yen; RMB 
n __ 
represents the Chinese Renminbi; and DEM represents the Deutsche mark . The error 
term ^ is a zero mean white noise. The determinant currencies are chosen on the basis 
of trading shares 9. The U.S. market accounted for 15.79%, 28.67%, 16.44%, and 
19.69% of the total trade value of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan 
respectively. The corresponding shares in the Japanese market are 10.94%, 23.56%, 
11.56%, and 17.61%; and 32.30%，8.03%, 6.36%，and 7.04% in the Chinese market. As 
regards the German market, the corresponding shares are 3.49%, 4.68%, 3.44%, and 
3.72%. Other major trading partners ranked above tenth are Asian economies whose 
currencies do not have great international influential power and are not included as 
8 The series of the Deutsche mark employed in this thesis combines two series: the Deutsche mark from 
January 1973 to December 1998 and the Euro from January 1999 to December 2006, with the latter 
multiplied by a conversion factor of 1.95583. 
9 The shares of different markets of the total trade value are average values which are computed from 
1980 to 2006 for Hong Kong and Korea, 1984 to 2006 for Singapore, and 1989 to 2006 for Taiwan. The 
average shares by market are then ranked. The trading statistics of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and 
Taiwan are taken from, respectively, Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, Singapore 




Monthly, nominal, end-of-period exchange rates in natural logarithm are used. All 
currencies are expressed in terms of the SDRI。，which is a unit of account for the IMF. 
The data are obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF and 
the Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan). With the historical fact that the 
Bretton Woods System collapsed in 1971 and the U.S. dollar started floating in 1973, 
the observation period chosen is from January 1973 to December 2006 for Hong Kong, 
Korea, and Singapore, and January 1979 to December 2006 for Taiwan^^ Another set of 
estimations is done with the observation period beginning from the adoption of the 
current exchange rate regime, that is, from November 1983 in Hong Kong, March 1980 
in Korea, August 1973 in Singapore, and May 1989 in Taiwan. A very similar result is 
obtained and hence is not reported. 
All series involved in a regression have to be stationary to avoid 'spurious 
regression'. The absence of a unit root is a characteristic of a stationary series. The 
stationarity of the currency series involved in the estimation of Equation (1)： HKD, 
KRW, SGD, TWD, USD, JPY, RMB, and DEM (a total of eight series) can be checked 
by testing if they possess a unit root. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, 
proposed by Fuller (1976) and Dickey and Fuller (1979，1981), is applied to test for a 
10 Since July 1974，the Fund has determined the value of the SDR daily on the basis of a basket of 
currencies, with each currency being assigned a weight in the determination of that value. Taking effect 
since January 1，2006, the SDR includes the U.S. dollar (44%), the Euro (34%), the Japanese yen (11%), 
and the pound sterling (l l%).The currencies in the basket are valued at their market exchange rates for the 
U.S. dollar. The U.S. dollar equivalents of each currency are summed to yield the rate for the SDR in 
terms of the U.S. dollar. The rates for the SDR in terms of other currencies are derived from the market 
exchange rates of these currencies for the U.S. dollar and the U.S. dollar rate for the SDR. 
11 The series of SDR to HKD, to KRW, and to SGR are taken from the International Financial Statistic 
(IFS). Due to unavailability of Taiwan data in the IFS, a series of SDR/TWD is computed by multiplying 
SDR/USD and TWD/USD, which are period end figures obtained from the IFS and the Central Bank of 
the Republic of China (Taiwan), respectively. The sample period of the TWD/USD series is from January 
1979 to December 2006 and so is the computed SDR/TWD. 
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unit root in the eight currency series by regressing the following equation: 
k 
AE： + r K i + X + ；^ (2) 
where E' are the Hong Kong dollar, the Korean won, the Singapore dollar, the New 
Taiwan dollar, the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, the Chinese Renminbi, and the 
Deutsche mark; t is a linear time trend; and k is the number of lagged dependent 
variables included to tackle autocorrelation in the error term s which is a zero mean 
white noise. The value of k is chosen by the general-to-specific procedure of Perron 
(1989)12. All the eight currency series are found to be non-stationary; hence, their first-
differenced forms are tested by the ADF test for a unit root. The first-differenced series 
are stationary. Results of the test are presented in Table 2. 
As the first-differenced forms of the eight currency series are tested to be stationary, 
they are employed in the estimation of Equation (1). Results are reported in Table 3. As 
shown in the table, the four NIEs assign a heavy weight to the Dollar in determining 
changes in their currency values. In addition, the weights to the Dollar by the four NIEs 
are statistically significant at the 1% level, and this suggests that the Dollar still greatly 
overshadows these four currencies no matter what exchange rate regime the economies 
adopt. 
In the case of Hong Kong, a Dollar peg can be taken as a benchmark for 
comparison. It is natural that a heavy weight is assigned to the Dollar by Hong Kong as 
it has adopted a currency board arrangement since October 1983. However, the other 
12 
At first, a maximum value of A: = 12 was chosen. Then, the last lagged first-differenced term is 
examined to see if it is statistically significant at the 10% level (critical value in an asymptotic normal 
distribution is 1.645). If insignificant, the maximum value is reduced by one and the model is re-estimated 
with k=\\. The procedure is repeated and stops at either the last term that is statistically significant or k = 
0. Ng and Perron (1995) showed that this selecting procedure performs well compared to other data 
dependent procedures. 
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three economies are either managed floaters or independent floaters according to the 
IMF de facto classification dated July 2006. The currencies anchored by these three 
economies in managing their exchange rate are not officially announced. According to 
the estimation results presented in Table 3，the weights assigned to the Dollar by these 
three economies are the greatest relative to other foreign currencies such as the Japanese 
yen and the Chinese Renminbi. The substantially higher weight gained by the Dollar 
reveals its dominant and important role in the exchange rate policies of the four NIEs. 
Why does the Dollar have a greater influence on these economies than other foreign 
currencies? 
The Dollar's dominant role in the four NIEs, if not most of the East Asian 
economies, can be attributed to two main aspects: history and trade, 
i) Historical Perspective 
To date, the Dollar is inevitably enjoying its role as an international currency. This 
role can be traced back to the post-World War II period. In the 1940s, there were 
inflation and currency controls in Europe, as well as in Japan and most developing 
countries. At that time, only the U.S. had an intact financial system. The Dollar naturally 
became the world's currency for interbank transactions and was the intervention 
currency that governments used to stabilize their exchange rates. Meanwhile, the U.S. 
had an open capital market, countries could easily build up their Dollar reserves and 
have a liquid market in which to buy and sell them. Similarly, private corporations in 
other countries prefer keeping Dollar reserves because of the exchange control of their 
own currencies. History has established the international role of the Dollar. 
17 
ii) Trade 
The four NIEs tend to be trade-oriented economies. A stable exchange rate against 
the trading partner currencies lowers the exchange rate risk^^ Hence, exchange rate 
stabilization is one of the major concerns in their exchange rate policies. The question 
becomes, how do these trade-oriented economies stabilize the bilateral exchange rate 
against so many trading partner currencies? The trick is that most East Asian economies, 
including the four NIEs, prefer invoicing their trade in the Dollar rather than in their 
own currencies. The Dollar acts as an intermediary currency for trading in East Asian 
economies. Given that trade is invoiced in the Dollar, stabilizing the bilateral exchange 
rate against the Dollar could serve the purpose of controlling the exchange rates risks of 
most trading partners. Thus, the Dollar would gain a heavier weight in these four NIEs' 
exchange rate policies. 
The Dollar plays a crucial, if not dominant, role in the development of exchange 
rate regimes and the exchange rate policies of the four NIEs. Even so, it does not imply 
that the four NIEs have handed in their sovereignty over monetary policies to the U.S. 
This thesis attempts to explore the issue of monetary independence in a way described 
in the following chapters. 




To investigate the relationship between the exchange rate regime and the monetary 
independence across the four NIEs, first of all, a measurement of 'monetary 
independence' has to be decided, which will be presented in Section 4.1. Then, 
estimation methods to evaluate and compare the measurement across the exchange rate 
regimes of the four NIEs are determined, which will be given in Section 4.2. 
4.1 Measurement of the Monetary Independence 
Regarding the measurement of monetary independence, different approaches have 
been employed in the literature. Borensztein et al. (2001) and Frankel et al. (2004) 
regard this independence as the ability of a domestic economy to isolate from 
international shocks. Borensztein et al. (2001) measure the independence by the reaction 
of domestic interest rates and exchange rates on international financial shocks, such as 
sudden changes in the U.S. monetary policy and surprises in the risk premia attached to 
emerging international market bonds. With a similar but narrower idea, Frankel et al. 
(2004) measure the independence using the reaction of domestic interest rates on the 
changes in the major countries' interest rates. Frankel et al.(2004) consider the 
international shocks as changes in interest rates of major countries such as the U.S. and 
Germany. Likewise, Bordo and MacDonald (2003) and Shambaugh (2004) take 
movements of short-term interest rates as a measure of the independence. That is, how 
much do the domestic interest rates respond to changes in foreign rates? 
In this thesis, the measure of monetary policy is proxied by the movement of the 
short-term interest rate. The monetary independence of each of the four NIEs is then 
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measured by the linkage of the movement of domestic rate with an international rate. 
This measurement is intuitive and appealing based on the following justifications. 
Firstly, a country's execution in monetary policy would account for the movement 
of nominal interest rate because the implementation of an expansionary or a tightening 
monetary policy (increase or decrease in money supply) puts changes in the interest rate. 
For example, the purchase of domestic assets by a central bank would put a temporary 
downward pressure on the domestic interest rate. Moreover, interest rate targeting or 
manipulation is a prevailing monetary policy. The most prominent example is the 
United States, in which the Federal Reserve engages in a gradual tightening of monetary 
policy by raising the federal funds rate to tackle unanticipated i n f l a t ion 14. Other 
examples are Argentina and Brazil, in which exchange rate stabilizations were 
supported by hiking interest rates on short-term government debt to increase demand for 
domestic assets, and thus, prevent speculative attacks against the domestic currency^^. A 
more recent case attributed to Hong Kong was subsequent to Thailand's decision to 
abandon its fixed exchange rate system in July 1997. Hong Kong raised interest rates to 
300 basic points in a night's time to defend its currency board system. Goodhart (1989) 
notes that 'monetary policy operations of the Central Banks' can be viewed as 'quantity 
or rate setting actions'. Generally, central banks prefer a short-term interest rate as their 
monetary policy instrument, even though a few central banks such as the German 
Bundesbank and the European Central Bank still manipulate monetary aggregates. 
Goodhart observes that adjustments to the level of short-term interest rates can be 
regarded as the only effective monetary instrument under the financial innovation and 
14 See Taylor (1998) for details. 
15 See Calvo and Vegh (1995) for details. 
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money demand instability of recent decades. Moreover, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) have 
presented evidence that the interest rate is a recurrent policy tool to smoothen exchange 
rate in the claim-to-float countries. Hence, changes in interest rates somehow mirror the 
implementation of a monetary policy. 
Secondly, the linkage between the movement of domestic rates and that of an 
international rate could account for the independence by referencing countries' 
experiences under the Bretton Woods system. Experiences from countries other than the 
U.S. under the Bretton Woods system tell that the bilateral exchange rate against the 
U.S. dollar could be held fixed only if they kept the domestic interest rate in line with 
that of the U.S. The exchange rate stability is reflected in the change of domestic 
interest rate in response to the U.S. rate. Moreover, the exchange rate stability and 
monetary independence cannot co-exist under perfect capital mobility by the impossible 
trinity. The response of domestic interest rate can reflect exchange rate stability on the 
one hand and a lack of monetary independence on the other. Therefore, the movement 
of interest rate can indicate the degree of monetary independence. Inferences, of 
whether or not a country with a flexible rate is 'importing' the monetary policy of a 
foreign country, can be drawn from the observed interest rate movement with that of the 
foreign rate. 
With the monetary independence reflected by the movement of nominal short-
term interest rate, this thesis attempts to examine the linkage between the movements of 
the four NIEs rates and that of the U.S. 
4.2 Specification of Model 
In the literature, there are two exchange rate determination theories, namely, the 
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Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) and the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). The 
former is utilized in this thesis to investigate the issue of monetary independence, 
mainly due to the fact that PPP gives, regardless of the exchange rate regime, a long run 
equilibrium exchange rate if it is used as a policy tool in the exchange rate 
determination. However, UIP requires countries under fixed exchange rate regimes to 
have the same nominal interest rates as the anchored country's rate. This requirement 
provides a direction towards investigating monetary independence in terms of a 
country's ability to set its own nominal interest rates. Moreover, exchange rate 
determination based on the UIP, an asset approach, utilizes the local interest rate as a 
policy instrument, while the PPP, a monetary approach, deals with local prices. While 
interest rate targeting or manipulation is a prevailing monetary policy, the issue of the 
independence across different exchange rate regimes is investigated using the UIP. 
Detailed explanations are given in Appendix A. The UIP states that the interest rate 
differential of two economies is equal to the expected change in exchange rates between 
two economies' currencies: 
~ = r : + ( E l , - E , ) / E , (3) 
where r\ denotes a domestic nominal interest rate in domestic currency at time t; r* 
stands for a foreign nominal interest rate; E二 is the expected nominal exchange rate of 
domestic currency per foreign currency at time t+1; and E^ is the prevailing nominal 
exchange rate of domestic currency per foreign currency. With perfect capital mobility, 
Equation (3) predicts that under fixed exchange rate regimes in which -F^ = 0, 
shocks to the foreign rate is fully transmitted to the domestic rate, that is, r\ = r*. UIP 
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requires economies under fixed exchange rate regimes to have the same nominal 
interest rates as the anchored country's rate. As revealed in Chapter 3，the U.S. plays a 
crucial role in the exchange rate regimes and policies of the four NIEs. The U.S. rate is 
chosen as the anchored foreign rate for the four NIEs in examining the issue of 
monetary independence using the UIR The issues under investigation are: 1) whether or 
not there exists an 'association' between the movements of the four NIEs rates with that 
of the U.S. rate; and 2) if such an 'association' exists, to what extent are the changes in 
the domestic interest rates associated with that in the U.S. rate. .These questions are 
formalized by the following specification: 
r; 二 cc + prf (4) 
where r/ denotes the domestic nominal interest rate in domestic currency of economy i 
at time t.’ i represents Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, or Taiwan; and stands for the 
U.S. rate. The error term ^ is a zero mean white noise. 
In the literature, such as studies by Goldfajn and Olivares (2001), Frankel et al. 
(2004), and Shambaugh (2004)，there are factors other than the movement of the U.S. 
rate affecting the movement of the domestic interest rate. The first one is the intensity of 
capital controls of the four NIEs. The controls of domestic capital that flows into the 
world market can dampen the response of domestic rates to changes in international 
rates. Such controls allow domestic monetary authorities to maintain interest rate levels 
deviated from the U.S. rate for extended periods, even under fixed exchange rate 
regimes. Secondly, the extent of business cycle synchronization between the four NIEs 
and the U.S. also affects the movement of the four NIEs rate and the U.S. rate. If the 
business cycles of the four NIEs are highly synchronized with the U.S., the domestic 
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macroeconomic development, and hence the monetary stances, will more or less be the 
same as those of the U.S. Therefore, the domestic rates and the U.S. rate will tend to 
move closely together. 
One may suggest controlling these factors in examining the linkage of the 
movements between the NIEs rates and the U.S. rate. Notwithstanding these 
considerations, the central concern in this thesis is the linkage between the movements 
of the domestic rates and the U.S. rate. Thus, the starting point is to find if there is a 
long run relationship between each of the four NIEs rates on the U.S. rate, rather than 
sorting out the role of other factors affecting the comovement. Moreover, Frankel et al. 
(2004) find similar results with a model that only includes the U.S. rate and models 
incorporating inflation rate and controlling dummies indicating crisis, hyperinflation, 
and changes in exchange rate regimes. Shambaugh (2004) also tried controlling other 
factors and presented that various controls (time, trade, volatility of the exchange rate, 
and various measures of foreign debt) do not alter the conclusion obtained from a 
simple model specified as Equation (4). Both of the two studies from Frankel et al. 
(2004) and Shambaugh (2004) investigate the cases of Hong Kong, Korea, and 
Singapore. In view of the similar results obtained in these studies, the regression 
specified in (4) only considers the U.S. rate as the regressor in order to study the long 
run relationship between each of the four NIEs rates and the U.S. rate. 
Different models are employed in the literature to study the linkage between the 
domestic rate and the U.S. rate in order to measure monetary independence. For instance, 
Jesus and Cezary (2006) employ Dynamic Conditional Correlation Multivariate 
GARCH (DCC-MGARCH) models to estimate the degree of time-varying correlation in 
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interest rate shocks between the new European Union member countries and Germany 
and the US. Bordo and MacDonald (2003), Frankel et al. (2004), and Shambaugh (2004), 
make use of error correction models to compare, between fixed rate and floating rate 
countries, the estimates of the speed of adjustment parameter and the long run 
parameters in the error correction term. This thesis attempts to examine not only a 
linkage but also to reveal a long run relationship between the domestic rate and the U.S. 
rate, therefore the cointegration tests and the corresponding error correction models are 
employed. Bordo and MacDonald (2003), Frankel et al. (2004), and Shambaugh (2004) 
incorporate the error correction term in the estimation regardless of whether the interest 
rate series is cointegrated or not. Contrary to the three studies, in which cointegration is 
not tested before estimating with an error correction term, a two-step method proposed 
by Engle and Granger (1987) is employed in this thesis so that the order of integration 
of the interest rates are identified and cointegration is then tested. Results are presented 
in Section 5.3 of Chapter 5. 
In principle, comovement in the interest rates does not necessarily imply a lack of 
monetary independence as monetary policy can be conducted via changes in monetary 
base, required reserve ratio or other monetary targets. However, as explained in Section 
4.1 of this Chapter, this thesis examines the interest rates' linkages to study the 
independence because an expansionary or a tightening monetary policy puts changes in 
interest rate and interest rate targeting or manipulation is a prevailing monetary policy. 
On the other hand, there are many factors governing the comovement between the 
domestic rate and the U.S. rate, for example, synchronization of the business cycles of 
the domestic and the U.S. economies, common shocks affecting the domestic and the 
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U.S. economies simultaneously. Considering these two factors, a similar domestic 
interest rate movement with the U.S. may be due to the fact that domestic monetary 
authorities choose similar monetary policy stances, and hence similar interest rate 
pattern, even though they are able to develop an independent monetary policy. These 
considerations leave room for further research. The primary concern in this thesis is to 
examine an empirical regularity, such as a long run relationship, regarding the observed 
link between domestic and the U.S. rates. 
One should take heed of the endogeneity problem in the estimation of Equation (3). 
Frankel et al. (2004) assume that the U.S. rate is exogenous, and hence, is 
contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error term. However, Borensztein et al. (2001) 
question the exogeneity property of the U.S. rate. Borensztein et al. (2001) point out 
that the existence of common shocks which affect both domestic and foreign interest 
rates leads to a potential endogeneity problem. In view of this problem, Hausman's test 
is carried out to examine the exogeneity property of the U.S. rate. Details of the 





Monthly period-end nominal interest rates are used for Singapore For other 
economies, period-average series are used for the reason that longer series allows the 
sample period to be extended up to the years when these economies began to adapt the 
current exchange rate regimes. Although the equality ofUIP is based on arbitrage which 
is a speculative activity at particular points in time, period-end data are not necessarily 
better than the period-average data. It is because the speculative activities are able to 
occur every trading day. The period-end data would miss some information related to 
the speculations occurring intra-the-period. The interest rates of the four NIEs are 
proxied by either the interbank offered rate or the money market rate. The U.S. rate is 
represented by the federal funds rate. The sample periods of the four NIEs start from the 
month following the adoption of the current exchange rate regime. Hong Kong has 
operated the currency board system since October 1983, so its sample period starts from 
November 1983. Although Korea claimed to be an independent floater in November 
1997，a sample period starting from 1997 would be relatively short. Hence, the sample 
period of Korea traces back its previous exchange rate system, a managed float, and 
starts in March 1980. Singapore claimed to be a managed floater in June 1973. However, 
its interest rate data starts in August 1973 and so does its sample period. Taiwan has 
been an independent floater since April 1989, and therefore its sample period begins in 
May 1989. Details of the data used in the empirical analysis are presented in Table 4. All 
series are in natural logarithm. 
Before examining the regression specifications, a graphical inspection of each of 
16 Period-average data of Singapore are not available. 
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the four NIEs rates vis-a-vis the U.S. rate is informative. Figure 1 plots the interest rate 
of Hong Kong vis-a-vis that of the U.S. for November 1983 to December 2006. Figure 2 
shows the interest rates of Korea and the U.S. over the period of March 1980 to 
December 2006. The Singapore rate vis-a-vis the U.S. rate from August 1973 to 
December 2006 is displayed in Figure 3，whereas the Taiwan rate and the U.S. rate are 
graphed in Figure 4 from May 1989 to December 2006. 
Hong Kong links its currency to the U.S. dollar via a currency board system. 
Consequently, its interest rates have to be adjusted along with the U.S. rate. In Figure 1， 
the Hong Kong rate generally kept closely in line with the U.S. rate since the adoption 
of the currency board system in October 1983 except for two periods: firstly, the 1980s 
when the currency board system was newly introduced and secondly, the years 1997 and 
1998, when it suffered from the Asian financial crisis. During the 1980s, there have been 
substantial deviations, notably in July 1984，in late 1985，in December 1986，and in 
January 1988, due to large capital inflows or outflows. In the initial period after the 
launch of the currency board system, due to the shaky economic and political situation, 
1 N 
the presumed 'arbitrage and competition' mechanism did not work (Financial Services 
Bureau, 1998) and the linked official rate was held imperfectly. Therefore, Hong Kong 
has been under serious market attack in which speculative inflows or outflows of 
currency were present in anticipation of an upward revaluation or a downward 
1 Q 
devaluation of the Hong Kong dollar. In order to drive away the speculation, the Hong 
Kong government intervened in the foreign exchange market, manipulated the interest 
17 As introduced in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3, there are two rates of HKD to USD: the official rate and the 
market rate. These two rates are believed to converge by two mechanisms, one of them being 'arbitrage 
and competition'. For more details, refer to Section 3.1 of Chapter 3. 
18 This phenomenon is named 'external drain'. 
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rates, and implemented administrative measures (including the legal incorporation of 
'negative interest rates', when the HK dollar faced the speculative pressure of 
revaluation in 1978 - 1988).^^ Hence, there were remarkable deviations between the 
Hong Kong rate and the U.S. rate in the 1980s. Secondly, the deviations in 1997 and 
1998 were due to speculation attacks during the Asian financial crisis. Speculators took 
out large short positions against the Hong Kong dollar with the aim of destabilizing the 
linked exchange rate. The attacks activated the autopilot mechanisms under the currency 
board system and drove up interbank interest rates to high levels. The most notable one 
was on 23rd October 1997, when the overnight interest rate shot up to nearly 300%. 
In the case of Singapore, which is a managed floater within the sample period, the 
movement of the Singapore interest rate traces that of the U.S. rate closely as displayed 
in Figure 3. Regarding the cases of Korea and Taiwan, which are independent floaters, it 
is natural that there is no obvious pattern of comovement between their interest rates and 
the U.S. rate in Figures 2 and Figure 4. 
Upon graphical inspection, unit root tests are carried out followed by the 
Hausman's test. Then, cointegration is tested with Engle and Granger (1987) two-step 
procedures and the corresponding error correction models are estimated. 
5.1 Unit Root Test 
The stationarity of the interest rate series are tested with the ADF test. The five 
interest rate series are test by the ADF test proposed by Fuller (1976) and Dickey and 
Fuller (1979, 1981) for a unit root. The test starts by regressing the following equation: 
19 See Nugee (1995) for an official admission. See also sub-section VI. 1 in Schwartz (1993), which 
describes the arrangements from October 1983 to July 1988 as 'flawed' due to the deficiencies in the 
mechanisms for both cash arbitrage and interest rate arbitrage. 
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Ar/ = « o + + Kx + + s\ (5) 
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where r denotes the interest rate series; i represents the four NIEs and the U.S.; t is a 
linear trend; and k is the number of lagged dependent variables included to tackle 
autocorrelation in the error term s，which is a zero mean white noise.. The value of k is 
chosen in the general-to-specific procedure of Perron (1989)20. All the five interest rate 
series are found to be non-stationary. In view of this, all the five series is first 
differenced. The ADF test is employed again to test the stationarity of the first-
differenced series. They are found to be stationary. The five interest rate series are said 
to be integrated in the order (1)，that is, 1(1). The ADF test results are presented in 
Table 5. 
5.2 The Endogeneity Test 
Borensztein et al. (2001) suggested that the estimation of specification (4) suffers 
from an endogeneity problem due to the contemporaneous correlation between the U.S. 
rate, r^^^，and the error term, e^  .The instrumental variable estimation using a one-
period-lag U.S. rate, ，as an instrumental variable (IV) for r^^ is considered. The 
Hausman's test, detailed in Appendix B, is employed to examine if the IV estimation is 
needed. The method used for implementing the IV technique is the two-stage least-
squares (2SLS) estimation. The one-period-lag U.S. rate, r二, is chosen as the IV based 
on two properties: first, the lagged U.S. rate is uncorrelated with the current disturbance 
20 
At first, a maximum value of k = 12 was chosen. Then, the last lagged first-differenced term is 
examined to see if it is statistically significant at the 10% level (critical value in an asymptotic normal 
distribution is 1.645). If insignificant, the maximum value is reduced by one and the model is re-estimated 
with k= l l . The procedure is repeated and stops at either the last term that is statistically significant or k=0. 




term and secondly, the current period U.S. rate and its one-period-lag are highly 
correlated. 
The Hausman's test is carried out to compare the least squares estimator, , and 
the IV estimator, jS^y，obtained from estimating the following two specifications 
respectively: 
ri + 乂，叫 (6) 
尸 尸 + 〜 (7) 
where is the fitted value from regressing r尸 on • The error terms, and 〜厂， 
are zero mean white noises. The Hausman's test is carried out for each of the four NIEs 
interest rate series. The five interest rate series are 1(1) upon the unit root test results in 
Session 5.1 of Chapter 5，so the first-differenced series are used in the Hausman's test. 
The Hausman statistics of the four NIEs in Table 6 do not reject the null of no 
correlation between the current U.S. rate and the error term at conventional significance 
levels. The U.S. rate can be treated as exogenous in each regression of the four NIEs. 
5.3 Cointegration Test and Error Correction Model 
To test whether or not each of the four domestic interest rates and the U.S. rate are 
cointegrated，the testing procedures proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) are used. 
First, each of the four NIEs rate is tested to see whether it is self-integrated with order 1， 
i.e. ri �1(1) or not. Then, a cointegrating regression of the following equation is run: 
〜 ; (8) 
where and 严 are the interest rates notations same as those specified in Equation (4); 
and z denotes an error term which is a zero mean white noise. Afterwards, the ADF test 
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with an intercept is employed to test the presence of a unit root in the residual, 
z', = r; - pr"'. The unit root regression of the following equation is run: 
k 
必t + l^lx + Z 必叫 
y=l ^ , 
where s过 denotes an error term which is a zero mean white noise. A check for 
robustness is then carried out by using the U.S. interest rate as the dependent variable in 
this two-step Engle and Granger cointegration test. The t-ratio from this test, however, 
no longer has the Dickey-Fuller distribution. The distribution of this test was first 
tabulated by Engle and Granger (1987) and is thus named the Engle-Granger 
distribution. The tables of critical values are included in Engle and Yoo (1987) and the 
more precise values are in MacKinnon (1991). The latter is employed in this thesis. The 
number of lagged terms, k, is again chosen by the general-to-specific procedure of 
Perron (1989). 
Table 7 reports the results of the Engle-Granger cointegration test for the four NIEs 
rates. The null of non-cointegration is rejected in the cases of Hong Kong and Singapore 
FY I 
at the 5% significance level . However, evidence of cointegration is not found in the 
cases of Korea and Taiwan. The estimation model for Hong Kong and Singapore 
incorporates an error correction term (ECT) and is specified as follows: 
丨=a +卢siArf +S{rU + < (10) 
where i represents Hong Kong and Singapore; and s denotes an error term which is a 
A check for robustness is then carried out by using the U.S. interest rate as the dependent variable in 
this two-step Engle and Granger cointegration test. The testing statistics in the cases of Hong Kong and 
Singapore support a robust result of cointegration between the domestic rate and the U.S. rate. Refer to 
note 4 of Table 7 for details. 
32 
zero mean white noise. For the cases of Korea and Taiwan, the relationship between the 
domestic rates and the U.S. rate is estimated by regressing the first-differenced domestic 
rate on the first-differenced U.S. rate without an error correction term. The estimation 
model for Korea and Taiwan is specified as follows: 
Ar/ +£； (11) 
where i represents Korea and Taiwan; s denotes an error term which is a zero mean 
white noise. The estimation results of specification (10) and (11) are given in Table 8. 
In the case of Hong Kong, a long run relationship which should be driven by the 
Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) exists between the domestic rate and the U.S. rate. 
The coefficient showing the changes in the domestic rate in response to the changes in 
the U.S. rate in the long run Plr is 0.9209. It is expected that this coefficient is near 
unity as Hong Kong is adopting a currency board system and has linked its currency to 
the U.S. dollar. Under a credible fixed-rate system, a one-for-one response is expected in 
the long run between the Hong Kong rate and the U.S. rate in accordance with the UIP. 
The credibility of the currency board system is also supported by the short run response 
coefficient P^r which is 0.9827. To prevent arbitrage between the two markets, a near 
unity value is also expected in the short run. This is revealed by the fact that the banks in 
Hong Kong would follow the decisions of the Federal Reserve in the changes of interest 
rate. Moreover, the adjustment coefficient S bears a negative sign showing that any 
disobedience of the UIP from one period is corrected in the next period towards unity. 
Under the circumstance of having no autonomy in determining its own interest rate, 
Hong Kong cannot use the interest rate as a policy instrument to stabilize the economy 
when inflation is out of control. 
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In contrast to the fixed-rate system in Hong Kong, Singapore is adopting a managed 
floating system. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) monitors the Singapore 
dollar against an undisclosed basket of currencies. Even though the basket is 
undisclosed, the result of the Frankel-Wei regression in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 shows 
that a heavy weight is assigned on the U.S. dollar in MAS's exchange rate policy. The 
estimated result supports a long run comovement between the Singapore rate and the 
U.S. rate. Though the response coefficients, both in the short run and in the long run, are 
smaller than those of Hong Kong, they are not far away from unity and are highly 
significant. The long run response coefficient is 0.8042 while the short run one is 0.6532. 
This may not be an evidence of a de facto pegging system adopted by Singapore, as the 
UIP only says that the fixed-rate system implies a comovement between the domestic 
rate and an anchored country's rate but not the other way round. However, the long run 
comovement relationship between the Singapore rate and the U.S. rate is an evidence of 
a loss of independence in using the domestic rate as a policy tool. Moreover, the 
adjustment coef f ic ien t i s -0.1646, which is larger in absolute term than that of Hong 
Kong. The adjustment speed in responding to the changes of the U.S. rate is faster than 
Hong Kong. This further shows a tight relationship between the Singapore rate and the 
U.S. rate. 
For the case of Korea, however, cointegration between the domestic rates and that 
of the U.S. is not found to be present. A one percentage change in the U.S. rate causes 
0.07 percentage change in the Korea rate. The coefficient is negligibly small and even 
insignificant. It shows that there seems to be no statistically significant relationship 
22 It is not the absolute change in the rate by one percent since the data are in natural logarithm. Let us say, 
if the rate increased from 1% to 2%, it is said that the rate increased by 1 percent, but the percentage 
change is 100%. 
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between the Korea rate and the U.S. rate. Although the regression in Section 3.2 of 
Chapter 3 shows a heavy weight of the U.S. dollar in the Korean exchange rate policy, 
the weak relationship may be accountable by a country risk premium. The UIP says that 
in a world without uncertainty, the domestic and foreign interest rate differential equals 
the current and future exchange rate differential. For example, if the current and future 
exchange rates were the same and the domestic interest rate were higher than the future 
exchange rate, then foreigners could move their money into the domestic market, earn a 
higher return, and then convert their money back into their national currency. However, 
if there is uncertainty in the exchange rates and the country has a default risk, investors 
would demand compensation in the form of a premium. This risk premium could be a 
main cause of the interest rate differential in the case of Korea. In particular, there exists 
an unstable political relationship with North Korea, which increases the investment risk 
in Korea. Another reason for the insignificant relationship between the Korea interest 
rate and the U.S. rate could be accounted for by its emerging economy status, which is 
still not open enough for foreign investment. Following the doctrine of the impossible 
trinity, monetary independence and fixed exchange rate can coexist under capital 
immobility. If there is a great barrier in capital movement to and from Korea, the Korea 
rate does not have to follow the U.S. rate, even if Korea puts a heavy weight in the U.S. 
dollar in its policy. The detailed reasons for the weak relationship between the Korea 
rate and the U.S. rate are not the focus of this thesis and can be left for further research. 
The key is that monetary independence, in terms of retaining the domestic interest rate 
as a policy instrument and the autonomy of changing the value of the interest rate, is 
supported by the results. 
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In the case of Taiwan, cointegration is not found either. A one percentage change in 
the U.S. rate causes a 0.35 percentage change in the Taiwan rate. A long run relationship 
between the Taiwan rate and the U.S. rate does not exist even though a heavy weight is 
assigned to the U.S. dollar in the exchange rate policy (from the results of Section 3.2 in 
Chapter 3). Furthermore, the response coefficient is not near the unity. The political 
relationship between China and Taiwan could play an important role in the investment 
risk of Taiwan, resulting in a high risk premium affecting the interest differential. 
Moreover, inner Taiwan politics could be a factor of the risk. Regarding the monetary 





This thesis investigates the issue of monetary independence across Hong Kong, 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. In view of a fact that the Federal Reserve has conducted 
monetary policy by targeting the federal funds rate since the late of 1970s (Cook and 
Hahn 1989), the U.S. stands as a prominent example of the prevailing monetary policy 
of interest rate targeting or manipulation. Hence, in this thesis, monetary independence 
is regarded as the ability of the monetary authority to retain the domestic interest rate as 
a policy instrument. Consequently, the monetary independence is measured by the 
sensitivity of the domestic interest rates to the U.S. rate. Based on the idea of Frankel et 
al. (2004)，the greater the extent of changes in the domestic rates attributed to the 
changes in the U.S. rate, the lesser the monetary autonomy is. 
The evidence obtained from the cointegration analysis supports the monetary 
independence in South Korea and Taiwan but not in Hong Kong and Singapore. Hong 
Kong has been operating under a currency board system since October 1983. To date, 
the Hong Kong dollar is linked to the U.S. dollar. To maintain the link, the Hong Kong 
interest rate has to change with the U.S. one. It could not freely utilize its domestic 
interest rates as a policy tool to retain its monetary independence. Otherwise, people can 
gain from borrowing the lower rate currency, converting to the counterpart currency at 
the linked rate and then lending out for a higher return. Thus, it is not surprising that a 
long run comovement is found to exist between the Hong Kong interest rate and the U.S. 
rate. While Hong Kong is obliged to keep track of the movement of the U.S. rate, it 
cannot implement a discretionary monetary policy under its currency board system to 
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target certain levels of interest rate in response to economy-specific situations. On the 
other hand, Korea experienced a managed floating system in the first two-thirds of the 
observation period and then an independently floating one in the late observation period. 
Taiwan set its currency free and adopted an independent float during the observation 
period. Following the doctrine of the impossible trinity, Korea and Taiwan could enjoy 
their monetary independence under an open capital market. The independence in these 
two economies is supported empirically in this thesis. Firstly, the independence is 
measured by changes in domestic rate apart from changes in the U.S. rate, and secondly, 
a long run relationship is not found between the U.S. rate and the two domestic rates, 
Korea and Taiwan (two independent floaters), which empirically demonstrates a greater 
extent of monetary independence than Hong Kong (a dollar linker) and Singapore (a 
managed floater). 
Regarding the results of Singapore, they are very similar to those of Hong Kong 
even though Singapore has operated a managed floating system based on a trade 
weighted currency basket, whereas the Hong Kong dollar is linked to the US dollar via a 
currency board system. While both Hong Kong and Singapore are smaller and more 
open economies relative to Korea and Taiwan , the distinct results of Hong Kong and 
Singapore compared with those of Korea and Taiwan in Chapter 5 give inference on a 
23 Hong Kong and Singapore are smaller than Korea and Taiwan with respect to the population and the 
area of the economy. According to the statistics taken from the CEIC database and the World Factbook, in 
2006, the population of Hong Kong and Singapore were, respectively, approximately 6.9 million and 4.5 
million people, while Korea and Taiwan were, respectively, approximately 48 million and 23 million 
people. However, the population density of both Hong Kong and Singapore are much higher than those of 
Korea and Taiwan. In 2006, Hong Kong and Singapore had a population density of more than 6000 
people per yb/^while Korea and Taiwan had a density of less than 1000 people per km .^ Although all the 
four NIEs are regarded as open economies in the literature, the extent of openness is a little different 
among them. From the figures of import and export share in GDP given in Table 1, Hong Kong and 
Singapore are much more open than Korea and Taiwan. The import and export share in GDP of Hong 
Kong and Singapore are more than 100% while those of Korea and Taiwan are equal to or less than 50%. 
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perennial issue: an optimal exchange rate regime, particularly for small open economies. 
Studies, such as those by Lu and Yu (1999) and Rajan and Siregar (2002), compare the 
economic environment of Hong Kong and Singapore and appraise the optimality of the 
current exchange rate regime adopted in these two economies. Both of them support the 
managed floating system for a small open economy. Lu and Yu (1999) even suggest that 
Hong Kong should take the experience of Singapore as a reference. However, doubts 
were expressed in Hausmann et al. (1999) whether or not a flexible regime would 
actually allow for much monetary autonomy, especially in small open economies. 
From the results of Hong Kong and Singapore, the domestic interest rate movement 
is seemingly indifferent in adopting a currency board system or a managed float system 
in small open economies; the domestic rate keeps track of the U.S. rate and the 
monetary authorities have a lesser extent of monetary independence. The similar 
estimation results suggest that the most prominent advantage of a flexible rate system -
preserving the domestic monetary independence - cannot be embodied in Singapore. 
Considering the notable advantage of a currency board system, namely, exchange rate 
stability, in facilitating international investment and capital flows, the adoption of the 
currency board system in Hong Kong offers a lesson worthy of notice for Singapore. 
The currency board system rescued Hong Kong from a currency crisis when it was 
implemented in October 1983 ^^ strengthened international confidence in Hong Kong 
when the Tiananmen motion happened in 1989，and stabilized the Hong Kong economy 
and defeated the Hong Kong dollar speculators during the Asian financial crisis in 1997 
and 1998. The Hong Kong dollar and the Chinese Renminbi were the only two 
24 For details, refer to Jao (1993) Chapter 4. 
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currencies among eight Asian currencies^^ which did not depreciate against the U.S. 
dollar during the Asian financial crisis. In 2003, although Hong Kong was attacked by a 
regional epidemic, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), the market rate of 
Hong Kong dollar per U.S. dollar did not fall below 7.80. In contrast, a flexible 
exchange rate regime for a financial centre like Hong Kong was thought to have carried 
considerable instability and uncertainty, particularly at a time when the territory was 
going through a very politically sensitive transition period, such as the sovereignty 
problem between China and Britain in the early 1980s. ^^  Now, under Chinese 
sovereignty, the Hong Kong economy will certainly synchronize more with the Chinese 
economy, and both economists and policy makers should deliberately think of any 
modifications of the currency board system which is linked to the U.S. dollar. 
Admittedly, the currency board system has its own drawbacks and might not be the 
best exchange arrangement. However, what an economy chooses may not be the best, 
but should be an optimal system to its own macroeconomic environment. It would be 
impractical, if not unrealistic, to say that Hong Kong's experience can be implemented 
elsewhere without having any deliberate considerations and prudent research. The facts 
of how the system rescued Hong Kong in several politically unstable periods, financial 
crisis, and economic downturn can be, in Williamson (1995)'s words, a "monetary 
evangel" for the small open economies. 
25 The eight Asian currencies are the Indonesian rupiah, Japanese yen, Korean won, Malaysian ringgit, 
Philippine peso, Singapore dollar, Taiwan dollar, and Thai baht. For detailed statistics, refer to Jao (1998). 
26 See Jao (1993) Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 for instability in several political transition periods experienced 
by Hong Kong. 
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Appendix A: Supplementary notes on UIP and PPP 
The specification, Equation (3)，in Chapter 4 is derived easily from the Uncovered 
Interest Rate Parity (UIP) with perfect capital flows. The exchange rate determination is 
based on two approaches: i) asset approach and ii) monetary approach. The former is 
based on the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) and is applied in the short run while 
the latter is based on the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) for the long run. A comparison 
between the two approaches is presented in the first sub-section below, followed by the 
reasons for taking the first approach to investigate the issue of monetary independence 
in this thesis. 
A.1 Comparison between the asset approach and the monetary approach 
If there is an increase in the U.S.' money supply (M^) , the asset approach will 
require a fall in the U.S. interest rate (R^), which will cause the dollar to depreciate a 
certain amount at time t to satisfy the Covered or Uncovered Interest Rate Parity. 
The monetary approach requires a rise in the U.S. price level (P^ ) to respond to the 
increase inM^. This leads to a rise in , a depreciation in dollar, to satisfy the PPP. 
The difference between the two approaches is the adjustment of R^ or P^ • 
Because prices cannot be adjusted in the short run, the asset approach is applied in the 
short run and the monetary approach is applied in the long run. 
A.2 Arguments of using UIP instead of PPP 
Studies such as Bordo and MacDonald (2003), Frankel et al. (2004) and 
Shambaugh (2004), that concern monetary independence among different exchange rate 
regimes, have put focus on the asset approach but not the monetary one. Why is the case? 
The main objective of the work on PPP is to examine whether or not exchange rates 
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adjust toward a level established by the PPP, which is a central question in exchange rate 
determination policy. 
Cassell (1918) introduced the specific terminology of PPP in the post-World War I 
period, during which large-scale inflations triggered international policy debates 
concerning an appropriate level for nominal exchange rates among the major 
industrialized countries. Cassell (1921) considered the PPP as providing an equilibrium 
value of the real exchange rate. Since then, PPP has played a central role in open 
macroeconomics by setting an anchor for the long run equilibrium real exchange rate. 
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, the prominent 
fluctuations of real exchange rates^^ aroused policy interest in terms of formulating an 
appropriate response to these deviations. Dombusch (1982) suggests a PPP-oriented 
exchange rate policy targeting a constant real exchange rate. Home (2004) points out 
that an earlier discussion about the policy significance of PPP has focused on the use of 
the real exchange rate as a benchmark for determining the par values of currencies of 
countries returning to the Gold Standard. Recently, Williamson (1992-1993) has 
proposed PPP as a reference equilibrium real exchange rate in target zones. These PPP 
studies aim to examine if exchange rates adjust towards a level established by PPP, and 
if PPP can be used as a tool in predicting the long run equilibrium exchange rates. This 
may be attributable to the fact that PPP, unlike UIP, gives a reference level of both 
nominal and real exchange rate regardless of exchange rate regimes. UIP requires, 
however, countries under fixed exchange rate regimes to have nominal interest rates 
similar to the anchored country's rate. This requirement provides a direction to 
27 Mussa (1986) finds that the variance of real exchange rates in the post-Bretton Woods period has been 8 
to 80 times higher than during the Bretton Woods period. 
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investigate monetary independence in terms of a country's ability to set its own nominal 
interest rates. Hence, literature about monetary independence is built on UIP but not on 
PPP in exchange rate determination. 
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Appendix B: The Hausman's Test 
The term 'endogeneity' originated in simultaneous equations analysis, but the term 
'endogenous explanatory variable' has evolved to cover any case in which an 
explanatory variable may be contemporaneously correlated with the error term. 
According to the argument of Borensztein et al. (2001)，there are common shocks which 
affect both the domestic interest rate and the U.S. rate, which are not explicitly specified 
in the estimation. The effects of the common shocks, which are omitted in specification 
and left in the error term, lead to a correlation between the U.S. rate and the error term. 
This correlation results in a potential endogenous U.S. rate. 
The contemporaneous correlation between the U.S. rate and the error term violates 
one of the Gauss-Markov assumptions and causes biasedness and inconsistency of the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators (Wooldrigde, 2006). Biasedness may due to, 
firstly, shocks to domestic economies that have a 'safe haven' effect but evoke great 
increases in the U.S. rate; secondly, shocks affect, positively and directly, both the U.S. 
rate and the domestic rates. The former shocks would bias the estimated effect of the 
change of the U.S. rate on the domestic rates downward while the latter ones would bias 
the effect upward. The consistency of the OLS estimator of p requires a zero 
covariance (no contemporaneous correlation) between the U.S. rate and the error term. A 
simple proof, modified from the work of Hill, Griffiths, and Judge (2001) (p. 309), for 
the OLS estimator, p^^，of Equation (3) is as follows: 
严)(r,-�,) 厂1^>尸-严K 
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To deal with the inconsistency of the least square estimators, instrumental variable 
(IV) estimation is used instead of the OLS estimation. Consider a variable z, which is 
not correlated with the error term but correlated with the U.S. rate. The IV estimator 
modified from the work of Hill, Griffiths, and Judge (2001) (p. 309)，is as follows: 
T 細 
'=1 /=1 
Taking the probability limits, plim, on Equation (B3), 
J. , „ Co\ariance(z,€) _ , 
— � = � � v放 i a n c e � z , , � ” because C o v a r = 0 (B4) 
Hence, the IV estimator is consistent. 
Hausman (1978) suggested a testing strategy28 using the statistical significance of 
the difference29 between the OLS estimator and the IV estimator to determine if the 
endogeneity problem has deleterious effects on the OLS estimator and if the IV 
estimation is needed. The logic of the Hausman's test is as follows. Under the null 
hypothesis, all the estimators of p, and p!” are consistent and is efficient 
relative to p^y • Under the alternative hypothesis, only p^^ is consistent while f i ^ is 
28 Earlier work refers to Wu (1973) and Durbin (1954). 
The IV estimators are consistent but still biased. Moreover, the OLS estimator is alwa ff . 
than the IV estimator because the variance-covariance matrix of the OLS estimator • ^^^ ent 
that of the IV estimator, and it will be actually smaller unless the IV z can � t h a n 
suspected endogenous variable. Refer to Greene (2003) Chapter 5 for Ihe 'deviatifn of h e T f f ' ' 
between the variance-covariance matrix of the two estimators. 山 tterence 
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inconsistent. Since is always more efficient than p^y, it is preferred if the null 
hypothesis is not rejected. Hausman suggested examining the difference between the 
two estimators, d = p^y- Pi^. Under the null hypothesis, plim d = 0，whereas under the 
alternative, plim d：?^： 0. The hypothesis is tested by the 'Hausman statistic', H = 
{pjy - ) [Estimated.AsymptoticVariance{/3jy ) - Estimated.Asymptotic.Variance^p^ ‘ 
The Hausman statistic follows the chi-square distribution with J degree of 
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Table 1 • Average Trade Shares in GDP of Asian NIEs, the United States, the European 
Union, and Japan from 1980 to 2005 
Exports of Goods and Services Imports of Goods and Services 
(%ofGDP) (%ofGDP) 
Asian NIEs ‘ ‘ 
Hong Kong 130.40 125.31 
Korea 34.06 32.91 
Singapore 165.05 152.65 
Taiwan 50.99 45.33 
High-income developed countries 
United States 9.63 \ 1 74 
European Union 29.38 29.37 
Japan LMZ 
Notes • “ 
1. For Singapore and Taiwan, the data of export and import shares in GDP are from the CEIC database 
For other economies, the data are taken from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank 
Group. 
2. The average trade shares of the European Union (EU) do not include those of Bulgaria and Romania 
which become members of the EU in 2007. 
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Table 2. Results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of the Exchange Rates Series 
Interest rate k ^ ^ ^ 
In Level 
HKD 11 -1.7468 1.6034 -1.1477 
KRW 9 -2.9590 4.8819 -1.7505 
SGD 9 -2.1494 2.3663 -1.6707 
TWD 12 -1.9084 2.0283 -1.9716 
USD 11 -2.7414 3.8722 -1.6838 
JPY 8 -1.6450 1.8216 -1.5718 
RMB 11 -1.6041 1.2878 -0.6049 
DEM 10 -2.8619 4.1450 -2.6409* 
In First difference 
AHKD 10 -4.7300*** 
AKRW 8 -6.1497*** 
ASGD 6 -6.8531*** 
ATWD 11 -5.8434*** 
AUSD 10 -4.7713*** 
AJPY 7 -6.2439*** 
ARMB 11 -4.6818*** 
ADEM 10 -7.6302*** 
Notes 
1. HKD represents the Hong Kong dollar; KRW represents the Korean won; SGD represents the 
Singaporean dollar; TWD represents the New Taiwan dollar; USD represents the U.S. dollar; JPY 
represents the Japanese yen; GBP represents the British pound; AUD represents Australian dollar; and 
NZD represents the New Zealand dollar. All currencies are in terms of the Special Drawing Right 
(SDR). 
2. Due to the unavailability of Taiwan's data in the International Financial Statistic (IFS), the series of 
SDR/TWD is computed by multiplying SDR/USD and TWD/USD, which are period-end values 
obtained from the IFS and the Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) respectively. The 
sample period for the New Taiwan dollar is from January 1979 to December 2006 while for all others 
is from January 1973 to December 2006.-
3. k is the optimal number of lagged first-differenced terms included in the unit root test to correct for 
serial correlation. It is chosen by the general-to-specific procedure of Perron (1989). 
4. TJ and T ^  are the t-statistics of the coefficient of E, , (or , in testing the first-differenced series) 
for regression, respectively, with trend and constant and with constant only.伞飞 is the F-statistic for 
jointly testing that the coefficients of trend and E,_\ are jointly zero. 
5. The critical values taken from Fuller (1976) for the sample size = 500 for the T j and T^ statistics at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level are, respectively, -3.98, -3.42, -3.13 and -3.44，-2.87, -2.57. 
The critical values taken from Dickey and Fuller (1981) for the sample size = 500 for the 為 statistic 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level are 8.34，6.30，and 5.36，respectively. 
6. ***，**, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3. Weights Assigned to Foreign Currencies in Determining the Changes in Value 
of the Four NIEs Currencies 
一 HKD KRW SGD TWD “ 
0.7468 0.9234 0.5672 0.9161 
USD (4.84)*** (6.29)*** (4.41)*** (12.17)*** 
-0.0046 0.1753 0.1354 0.0422 
JPY (-0.10) (2.40)** (3.21)*** (1.03) 
0.0450 -0.0068 0.0310 -0.0127 
RMB (1.75)* (-0.13) (0.92) (-1.63) 
0.0198 -0.0117 0.1965 -0.0399 
DEM (0.21) (-0.10) (2.29)** (-0.64) 
-0.0008 -0.0024 0.0008 0.0001 
Constant (-1.23) (-1.44) (1.36) (0.16) 
R^ 0.5770 0.1855 0.2498 0.6412 
SE 0.0110 0.0306 0.0126 0.0114 
F-statistic 59.05*** 22.89*** 10.13*** . 140.85*** 
DW 1.8888 2.0126 2.0147 2.0610 
Notes 
1. HKD represents the Hong Kong dollar; KRW represents the Korean won; SGD represents the 
Singaporean dollar; TWD represents the New Taiwan dollar; USD represents the U.S. dollar; JPY 
represents the Japanese yen; RMB represents the Chinese renminbi; and DEM represents the 
Deutsche mark. All currencies are in terms of the Special Drawing Right (SDR). 
2. Due to the unavailability of Taiwan's data in the International Financial Statistic (IFS), the series of 
SDR/TWD is computed by multiplying SDR/USD and TWD/USD, which are period-end values 
obtained from the IFS and the Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan), respectively. The 
sample period for the New Taiwan dollar is from January 1979 to December 2006 while all others are 
from January 1973 to December 2006. 
3. A set of estimation is done with the observation period beginning from the adoption of the current 
exchange rate regime, that is, November 1983 in Hong Kong, March 1980 in Korea, August 1973 in 
Singapore, and May 1989 in Taiwan. A very similar result is obtained and hence is not reported. 
4. ***, **，and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
5. The t statistics are in parentheses. Robust standard errors are used in the cases of Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Taiwan while the White test is carried out beforehand. The White statistics of Hong 
Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan are 62.4533’ 11.8205, 40.2324, and 30.5713，respectively. The 
null of homoskedasticity is rejected in the cases of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, and hence 
robust standard errors are employed. 
6. SE stands for the standard error of the regression. 
7. The F-test determines the overall significance of the model where the null of all regressors being 
zero. 
8. DW stands for the Durbin Watson statistic. 
9. The Prais-Winsten procedure is applied to the regression of HKD, KRW, and TWD. The transformed 
DW statistic is reported in these three regressions. Before applying the Prais-Winsten procedure，the 
DW statistics of the regression of Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan are 1.6577, 1.8211, and 1.4131, 
respectively, which reject the null of serially uncorrelated error terms in order 1. ’ 
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Table 4. Interest Rate Data Description 
Economy Interest Rate Sample Period Source 
Hong Kong Overnight Hong Kong Interbank 1983:11 - 2006:12 Hong Kong Monetary 
Offered Rate (HIBOR) Authority 
Korea Korea money market rate 1980:3-2006:12 International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) of the 
International Monetary Funds 
(IMF) 
Singapore Three-month Singapore Interbank 1973:8-2006:12 International Financial 
Offered Rate (SIBOR) Statistics (IFS) of the 
International Monetary Funds 
(IMF) 
Taiwan Overnight Taiwan Interbank Call 1989:5 - 2006:12 Central Bank of Republic of 
Loan rate China (Taiwan) 
United The U.S. Federal Funds Rate 1989:5 - 2006:12 International Financial 
States Statistics (IFS) of the 
International Monetary Funds 
(IMF) 
Notes 
1. The Korea money market rate is the average daily rate on call money, weighted by the volume of 
transactions. 
2. Since the period-average values of the three-month Singapore Interbank Offered Rate (SIBOR) are 
unavailable, values on the last Friday (or working day closest to the last Friday) of the month are 
employed. 
3. Although the U.S. Federal Funds Rate is available on July 1954，its estimation period changes with 
the estimation period of each of the four NIEs. The longest estimation period is in the Singaporean 
case which starts at August 1973. 
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Table 5. Results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of the Interest Rates Series 
Interest rate Sample Period k ^ Z"" 
In Level 
1983:11 -2006:12 10 -3.3221* 5.6173* -2.9245** 
rKR 1980:3-2006:12 11 -1.7862 1.5983 -I.1990 
r 'G 1973:8-2006:12 9 -2.9692 4.5255 -2.2680 
严 1989:5-2006:12 8 -1.4015 0.9920 -0.7748 
严 1973:8-2006:12 8 -3.0201 4.6692 -2.1988 
In First Difference 
A r " ^ 1983:12-2006:12 9 -4 5587*** 
A^M 1980:4-2006:12 10 -6 4389*** 
A t 犯 1973:9-2006:12 8 -6.2706*** 
At讽 1989:6-2006:12 12 .：3 
严 1973:9-2006:12 12 ^.8453*** 
Notes ’ 
1- r"K represents the overnight Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR); r 収 represents the 
Korea money market r a t e ;严 represents the three-month Singapore Interbank Offered Rate 
(SIBOR); r 观 represents the overnight Taiwan Interbank call loan rate; and 严 represents the U S 
Federal Funds Rate. • • 
2. k is the optimal number of lagged first-differenced terms included in the unit root test to correct for 
serial correlation. It is chosen in the general-to-specific procedure of Perron (1989) 
3. TT and r" are the t-statistics of the coefficient of 么 ( o r at；., in testing the first-differenced series) 
for regression, respectively, with trend and constant and with constant only. •飞 is the F-statistic for 
jointly testing that the coefficients of trend and r:_�are jointly zero. 
4. The critical values taken from Fuller (1976) for the r , and r " statistics at the 1%, 50/�’ and 10% 
significance level are, respectively, for 
sample size = 250 (Hong Kong and Taiwan): -3.99，-3.69，-3.13 and -3.46，-3.14，-2.57. 
sample size = 500 (Korea, Singapore and the U.S.)： -3.98, -3.42, -3.13 and -3.44' _2 87，-2 57 
The critical values taken from Dickey and Fuller (1981) for the 為 statistic at the 1%，，5%，and 10% 
significance level are, respectively, for 
sample size = 250 (Hong Kong and Taiwan): 8.43,6.34’ and 5.39; 
sample size = 500 (Korea, Singapore and the U.S.)： 8.34，6.30，and 5.36. 
5. ***, **，and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
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Table 6. Results of the Hausman's Test of the U.S. Rate in Each of the Four NIEs 
Estimation 
Economy Ordinary Least Square b ^ Instrumental Variable(2SLS) bjy Hausman Statistic 
Hong Kong 1.3227*** 2.0928*** 1.4565 
Korea 0.0733 0.1466 0.4090 
Singapore 0.6077*** 0.7374*** 0.2573 
Taiwan 0.2565* 0.3844 0.5228 
Notes 
1. ***, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1%, and 10% level, respectively. 
2. The Hausman statistic follows the chi-square distribution with degree of freedom 1, ；^^，with critical 
values at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are 2.71, 3.84，and 6.63，respectively. 
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Table 7. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of the Residuals from the Regression of 
Equation (9) 
Economy k 
Hong Kong 10 -3.4164** 
Korea 9 -2.8283 
Singapore 9 -3.3691** 
Taiwan 7 -0.9603 
Notes 
1. A: is the optimal number of lagged first-differenced terms included in the unit root test to correct for 
serial correlation. It is chosen using the general-to-specific procedure of Perron (1989). 
2. r^ is the t-statistic of the coefficient of the one-period-lagged, level-form residual from a regression 
with a constant but without a linear trend. 
3. The critical values for the unit root test of the residuals are taken from MacKinnon (1991) For any 
sample size T，the estimated critical value is fiJT + pjT^yNhQxt p., i= oo, and 1 or 2，are 
response surface estimates from the simulation experiment consisting of 25,000 replications The 
critical values at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively, are: ‘ 
Hong Kong (T = 277):-3.9385，-3.3594，and-3.0610; ， • 
Korea (T = 319): -3.9334，-3.3565, and -3.0590; 
Singapore (T = 400): -3.9266, -3.3527, and -3.0564; 
Taiwan (T =211): -3.9507，-3.3662，and -3.0656. 
4. A check for robustness has been carried out by using the U.S. interest rate as the dependent variable 
in this two-step Engle and Granger cointegration test. In the regression for robustness, the estimated 
obtained for Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan are -3.6263**, -2.9994,-3.4966** and 
-1.0654，respectively, indicating that a robust test of cointegration exists between the domestic rates 
and the U.S. rate for Hong Kong and Singapore. 
5. ** indicates the statistical significance at the 5% level. 
57 
Table 8. Estimated Regressions for Asian NIEs 
Economy < r ' ' i n theECT 及2 F-statistic DW 
Hong Kong 1.0205 -0.0997 0.9083 o.0942 0.3455 F(2，274) 2.0069 
(3.02)*** (-1.63)* (36.47)*** 5.43*** 
Korea 0.0664 0.0030 0.0742 F(l，317) 2.0064 
(0.97) 0.94 
Singapore 0.6532 -0.1646 0.8042 0.1257 0.1704 F(2，397) 2.0633 
(4.52)*** (-3.72)*** (94.55)*** 28.54*** 
Taiwan 0.2564 0.0147 F(l，209) 2.0014 
(1.76)*** 1143 3.11*** 
Notes 
1. ECT represents the error correction term and appears in the case of Hong Kong and Singapore in 
which non-cointegration is rejected. 
2. The t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Robust standard errors are used in the cases of Hong Kong 
and Singapore while the White test is carried out beforehand. The White statistics of Hong Kong, 
Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan are 51.9111，0.5005，55.3089，and 2.6235 respectively. The null of 
homoskedasticity is rejected in the cases of Hong Kong, and Singapore, and hence robust standard 
errors are employed. 
3. ***，and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1%, and 10% level, respectively. 
4. SE stands for the standard error of the regression. 
5. The F-test determines the overall significance of the model with the null of all regressors being zero. 
6. DW stands for the Durbin Watson statistic. 
7. The Prais-Winsten procedure is applied to the cases of Hong Kong and Korea to tackle the serial 
correlation problem in the error terms. The transformed DW statistic is reported in these two 
estimations. Before applying the Prais-Winsten procedure, the DW statistics of the regression of 
Hong Kong and Korea are 2.2740 and 1.7362 respectively, which reject the null of serially 
uncorrelated error terms in order 1. 
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Figure 1. Overnight Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate (HIBOR) and the U.S. 
Federal Funds Rate from November 1983 to December 2006 
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Figure 2. Korea Money Market Rate and the U.S. Federal Funds Rate from March 
1980 to December 2006 
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Figure 3. Three-month Singapore Interbank Offered Rate (SIBOR) and the U.S. Federal 
Funds Rate from August 1973 to December 2006 
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Figure 4. Overnight Taiwan Interbank Call Loan Rate and the U.S. Federal Funds Rate 
from May 1989 to December 2006 
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